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This paper challenges a conventional wisdom: that when discussing
political systems, small is democratic. And yet, can there be paradises
without serpents? The presumed manageability of small island spaces
promotes and nurtures dispositions for domination and control over
nature and society. In such dark circumstances, authoritarian rule is a
more natural ﬁt than democracy. By adopting an inter-disciplinary
perspective, this paper argues that small island societies may be
wonderful places to live in, as long as one conforms to a dominant
cultural code. Should one deviate from expected and established
practices, the threat of ostracism is immense. Formal democratic
institutions may and often do exist, and a semblance of pluralism may
be manifest, but these are likely to be overshadowed by a set of
unitarist and homogenous values and practices to which many
signiﬁcant social players, in politics and civil society, subscribe (at
least in public).
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Preamble: Tycho and Hven
All is changed, changed utterly:
A terrible beauty is born. (William Butler Yeats, 2002: Easter 1916)
Small islands1 lend themselves to near absolute human domination. They can
be bought, sold, leased or bequeathed to special individuals, who can then
transform them in accordance with their interests or whims, noble though
these may be. It was in such circumstances, in 1576, that Frederick II, King
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of Denmark, allocated the island of Hven (now part of Sweden) as a ‘ﬁef’ to
astronomer Tycho Brahe as his home and base for his many scientiﬁc activities.
Frederick II signed a document conferring:
to our beloved Tyge Brahe, our land of Ven . . . with all our and the crown’s
tenants and servants who live thereon, and with all the rent and duty which
comes from it . . . to have, enjoy, use and hold; free and clear, without any rent,
all the days of his life. (Thoren, 1990: 105)
This island, and Uraniborg castle in particular, was a prototype fully integrated
research facility, and a research centre of the highest order for its time. Tycho’s
plans also involved considerable social upheaval on Hven, however. The
project drafted the local peasants and ﬁshers as cheap construction labour, ‘har-
nessed in the service of science’, for at least eight years. As the undisputed ruler
of his ﬁefdom, Tycho was entitled to two workdays a week, from sunup to
sundown, per week from each of the 40 farms on the island . . . without pay
(Thoren, 1990: 106, 112). The islanders were certainly not amused (Christian-
son, 1999: 43; also reviewed in Mosley, 2001). Tycho acted very much as the
undisputed ‘Lord of Uraniborg’ (Thoren, 1990):
[H]e aimed to restructure the production of Hven in order to support a superstruc-
ture of scholars, scientists and servants. (Christianson, 1999: 37)
Over the winter of 1578, some of the peasants on Hven abandoned their
farms and left the island in order to escape the onerous and unceasing work
details and on 10 April 1578, the King, at Tycho’s request, issued an open
letter forbidding the peasants from leaving Hven (Thoren, 1990: 132).
A land ﬁt for kings, lords and governors?
I am monarch of all I survey,
My right there is none to dispute,
From the centre all round to the sea,
I am lord of the fowl and the brute. (Cowper, 1782)
Tycho’s behaviour may not have been extraordinary in its historical context: the
use of corve´e labour on public works projects was then still practised. It does
however conﬁrm the observation by McCall (1996: 1–2): ‘continentals covet
islands . . . while islanders themselves and their way of seeing things are
not much appreciated’. A few decades earlier, Thomas More had represented
the ideal commonwealth of Utopia as an island in order to have its bounded
and exclusive geography align with the perfect and sublime nature of its politi-
cal project (More, 1516). But such a place is perhaps also nowhere to be found:
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‘utopia’ translates as ‘nowhere’ in Greek. In its harmonious state, Aldous
Huxley’s Island is doomed and can only be betrayed (Huxley, 1962). Imperial
and capitalist greed found personiﬁcation in Robinson Crusoe, who surveyed
the island on which he was shipwrecked ‘with a secret kind of pleasure to
think that this was all my own, that I was king and lord of all this country’
(Defoe, 1719: 102). As told by Defoe, apart from being the gripping story of
a rugged survivor, the actual tale of Robinson Crusoe, ‘is also one of conquest,
slavery, robbery, murder, and force’ (Hymer, 1971: 29). ‘We’ve got an island all
to ourselves’, muses Peterkin in Coral Island. ‘We’ll take possession in the
name of the king; we’ll go and enter the service of its black inhabitants. Of
course we’ll rise, naturally, to the top of affairs. White men always do in
savage countries’ (Ballantyne, 1858/1867: 27–28). Such statements belie the
racist superiority and dreams of conquest of early Robinsonnades (e.g.
Loxley, 1990; Dash, 1998), but also the less-eagerly critiqued tendency
towards despotism. The craving to control continues today, with Farhad
Vladi selling islands (Vladi Private Islands, 2011); and Dubai selling the con-
structed islands of ‘the Palm’ and ‘the World’ archipelago off its coast (Jackson
& Della Dora, 2009). In such explicitly exclusive environments, fellow
humans – if they exist – tend not to be peers; but rather slaves, servants or
followers.
This paper
With their beguiling simple geography, small islands invite us to consider them
as comprehensible and manageable totalities (e.g. Lowenthal, 2007: 206–207).
Yet, even as we yearn, plot and dream of how we will make or change our
island, the island will change us, teasing out some despotic streaks. ‘Can one
be but a Governor on one’s own island?’ (Redﬁeld, 2000: 12; also Weaver-
Hightower, 2007). Perhaps, as ‘Lord of Uraniborg’, Tycho is the rule(r): he
is neither the exception nor a historical anachronism.
Much of the literature, realist and metaphorical, is replete with examples of
individuals that are ‘changed, changed utterly’ by their island sojourns. As
‘seedbeds of fertile imagination’ (Lowenthal, 2007: 203), islands help to
unleash and encourage the indulging of atavistic desires for power and
control, encouraging humans (usually men) to think that their island world is
an enticing tabula rasa; for all seasons and for all tastes. Which is why,
then, anything goes. This sounds like a recipe for a natural collapse into patri-
archal authoritarianism.
And yet, if one reads the speciﬁc political science literature, this extols
small, often island, jurisdictions as paragons of democratic behaviour. Can
both propositions, can both utopia and dystopia, be true? Which is it to be:
the idyllic setting of Jack, Ralph and Peterkin on Coral Island (Ballantyne,
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1858/1867), or its macabre response, Lord of the Flies (Golding, 1954) where
Jack triumphs over Ralph?
Small size, islands and democracy
In a recent article titled ‘Small is democratic: but who is small?’ the author’s
two opening sentences are unequivocal:
Research on . . . government suggests that small states are more likely to be
democratic than large states. Indeed, an abundance of ﬁndings support this
belief. (Anckar, 2010: 1)
Summarising the literature in the ﬁeld, Srebrnik (2004) contends that small
country size, coupled with islandness, has been shown to be conducive to
democracy and ‘good governance’; that smallness reinforces popular rule;
and that considerable evidence suggests that a signiﬁcant feature about
small jurisdictions has been their ability to maintain democratic political
systems (also Hintjens & Newitt, 1992). Anckar pe`re et ﬁls contend that
remoteness, islandness and small size are likely to spawn a feeling among
society members that they are alone in the world and thrown upon their
own resources: and so, ‘a spirit of fellowship and community’ would natu-
rally follow (Anckar & Anckar, 1995). With few exceptions, we are told
that the political systems of small island states are all highly democratic in
nature:
The small island countries of the international community are a welcome antidote
and contrast to the anarchy, autocracy, internal warfare, militarism, violence and
state collapse which is a feature of all too many larger, mainland states. (Srebrnik,
2004: 339)
In a tradition dating back at least to Plato and Aristotle, we are warned that the
polis should not be too large that its citizens are not able to assemble and
discuss politics (Taylor, 1960; Aristotle, 1996: xvi). Rousseau – who, by the
way, delighted in islands as havens for the solitary recluse (Rousseau, 1776–
78/1979: 103–104) – and Montesquieu argued that smallness was a precondi-
tion to the development of the liberal state, since only small size guaranteed that
citizens maintained an emotional attachment to the public good, had the oppor-
tunity to participate in direct democracy, and could exercise effective scrutiny
over their government (Rousseau, 1900: II: 88; de Montesquieu, 1949: VIII:
16–17). A much reduced political distance between the voter and the voted
makes citizens more politically aware and offers them better chances for reci-
procal communication; while the ethnic and cultural homogeneity more likely
to pertain to small polities arguably leads to increased community cohesion
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(Lijphart, 1977: 66; Sutton, 1987: 17; Anckar, 2002: 386–387). Small-scale
social structures are personalistic and informal; the overall pattern of social
interaction is more cooperative, and thus small social systems mitigate political
conﬂict, encourage elite cooperation and increase the stakes of citizens in the
regime (Ott, 2000: 111–124). The ‘insulation’ of small states from the inter-
national system allows them to avoid getting involved in warfare and hence
fosters a sheltered climate, conducive to democratic politics (Faris, 1999: 8–
9, 24). Being more ethnically and linguistically homogenous, small social
systems exhibit characteristics that tend to favour the maintenance of democ-
racy (Clague et al., 2001: 23 et seq.). For Schumacher (1973), small federated
states are ‘desirable’ because they are more human and can practise direct
democracy. According to Clark (2009: 607):
Small island states fare remarkably better than their larger continental counter-
parts in practising democracy . . . some studies suggest that small size may be
associated with greater solidarity and equality, and therefore fewer and less dis-
ruptive free-rider problems and violent conﬂicts.
Again, combining smallness and islandness, Dommen (1980: 931) argues that
island countries are ‘particularly fortunate’ and their politics ‘friendlier’, ‘more
benign’ and ‘freer of internal violence’; but then asks, tellingly: ‘why, then, do
so many people emigrate?’
The short answer is that small is not always beautiful (pace Schumacher,
1973; Murray, 1981). In small social systems (though not exclusively), person-
ality politics can override other considerations and can lead to patron–client
relationships, nepotism, corruption and pork barrel politics (Benedict, 1967:
8; Wood, 1967: 33–34; Lowenthal, 1987: 38–39; Bray and collaborators,
1991: 22; Peters, 1992: 128–129; Ott, 2000: 37–42; Wettenhall, 2001: 181;
Srebrnik, 2004: 334–335). Executive government is believed to be in a
much more powerful position in small polities, since it is all pervasive, ubiqui-
tous and impossible to avoid, thus undermining whatever checks and balances
may be present or desirable (Singham, 1967; Sutton, 1987: 12; Sutton & Payne,
1993: 592–593). Strangely enough, it is the very same sociological features
attributed to small size and scale, epitomised in island communities – strong
social networking, clannishness, high bonding social capital . . . – that
provoke the turn towards despotism.
When one scrutinises the key theoretical contributions towards understand-
ing the socio-political and economic origins of dictatorship and democracy,
small island jurisdictions are not taken into consideration (e.g. Moore, 1966;
Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005). The argument usually involves an emerging
industrial bourgeoisie playing a pivotal role; yet, most small island territories
have completely side-stepped an industrial phase in their development,
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leapfrogging from primary to service economies, and so such an argument
cannot possibly apply to most of them (Baldacchino, 1998). Instead, we are
more likely to read about democracy as practised on small island states as a car-
ryover from colonial practice (e.g. Hintjens & Newitt, 1992; Barrow-Giles,
2011). Indeed:
There is a strong tendency either for the larger (metropolitan) state to impose its
governing patterns on the smaller; or for the smaller to seek to emulate those pat-
terns in a fairly unreﬂecting way. (Wettenhall, 2001: 167)
Parliamentary democracy is one such ‘governing pattern’. For example, when
Britain relinquished its colonies in the Caribbean, it left in place political insti-
tutions and norms based on the Westminster model of government. Political
analysts have drawn largely positive assessments of the efﬁcacy of this West-
minster template in producing stable democratic polities in the region, in con-
trast to other, larger and continental, ex-colonial states (e.g. Domı´nguez &
Worrell, 1993; Payne, 1993). The template’s core conventions, as, for
example, measured by Washington DC-based Freedom House (2011) – parlia-
mentary supremacy; competitive, regular and free, multi-party elections; a non-
partisan civil service; civil rights and freedoms – have remained largely in
place in most small island states. The same can be said with regards to the gov-
ernance index published by theWorld Bank (2011), and based on six composite
indicators: political stability and absence of violence and terrorism; voice and
accountability; effectiveness of government; regulatory quality; rule of law and
control of corruption. However, the presence of formal democratic institutions
need not align with democratic practice. It may also be easy but naive for exter-
nal observers to praise small island social systems for formally displaying
democratic institutions; whereas the locals may report, witness and experience
otherwise.
A different discourse is gaining ground of late: the Westminster model in
the Caribbean context has its obvious limits. Divisive and monopolistic
‘winner takes all’ politics, long periods of one-party domination, rubber-
stamp parliaments, corruption and the entrenchment of patronage systems are
some of the more signiﬁcant characteristics (e.g. Clegg & Pantojas-Garcia,
2009; Barrow-Giles, 2011). Should such distortions of democracy be readily
seen as outcomes of the international drugs trade, rising crime levels, economic
downturn or of globalisation generally; or are they also exacerbated by the cir-
cumstances of political geography?
In a qualitative study of the emergence of party politics on the Caribbean
small island state of Grenada, Singham (1968) outlines the emergence of an
authoritarian-cum-charismatic leader in the context of democratic institutions.
The ‘hero’ with a working class background can emerge to politicise ‘the
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crowd’, manipulate its emotions and appeal to its loyalty. There are various
examples of ‘big men’ in small island politics, and not just in the Caribbean:
larger-than-life politicians-cum-father ﬁgures and folk heroes who exercise
almost total control over decision making in a jurisdiction for many years,
while the formal institutions of democracy persist (e.g. Klomp, 1986). Such pol-
itical actors are skilful at deploying a neo-colonialist island nationalism that pre-
sents them as mythic Davids contending bravely, and against all odds, with alien
Goliaths: think ClaudeWathey in Dutch SintMaarten, DomMintoff inMalta, as
well as Joe Smallwood and Danny Williams in Newfoundland, Canada (van
Bakel et al., 1986: 191–192; Boissevain, 1994; Cadigan, 2009).
Beyond the paradox
And so, to return to the key question: are small, often island, states and terri-
tories beautiful or ugly? Can one reconcile these two seemingly contradictory
observations? This paper argues that small island societies may be wonderful
places to live in, but only as long as one conforms to the dominant culture.
Should one deviate from expected and established practices, the threat of ostra-
cism is immense. Democratic practices and supporting institutions may exist
and operate, and a semblance of pluralism will be manifest, but all these are
likely to be overshadowed by what Dahl and Tufte (1973: 92, more below)
refer to as a ‘single code’: a set of homogenous values – be they religious, par-
tisan, sectarian, racial and/or linguistic – to which signiﬁcant social players
conform and subscribe (at least in public). Confronted by the pervasive and
stiﬂing totality, monopoly and intimacy of the local, small scale, socio-
cultural environment (Baldacchino, 1997), the options (after Hirschman,
1970) are: loyalty and conformity (via commitment or perfunctory compli-
ance); protest to a higher authority (where that exists); or displacement and
exile (or, better, ‘ex-isle’: Bongie, 1998). Shand (1980: 4) perceptively
observed:
Though it has been argued that small size is advantageous in that small [often
island] states will have greater social and political coherence, and hence be
easier to administrate, than larger states (e.g. Knox, 1967), there is little evidence
however that this is true.
Bray (1992: 26) avoids addressing the paradox, preferring instead to posit
that the ‘heaven and hell’ scenarios are the characteristics of two different, and
mutually exclusive, sets of small societies:
The societies of some small countries are harmonious because everybody
knows everybody else very well, and individuals ﬁnd ways to reduce or
avoid conﬂict. But the societies of other small countries suffer from bitter
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tensions because the scale is restricted and people know each other too well.
(emphasis mine)
Bray supports this argument with a sketch that separates these two worlds by a
solid diagonal line (Figure 1). And yet, this is a naive proposition: small island
societies can move from situations of harmony to conﬂict, and/or vice versa,
and on multiple levels of engagement. And, at any point in time, some
members of a small society can be in conﬂict with others, while others can
get along. At what point does the virtue of knowing someone very well
become the vice of knowing someone too well? The separation that Bray pos-
tulates between these two state types is meant to emerge, uncritically, from the
same condition: that of excessive familiarity.
This neat schizophrenia can absolve external observers from trying to
fathom, and come to terms with, domestic politics and factionalism, in much
the same way that tourists can enjoy a holiday in an island resort that is suitably
insulated from the turmoil outside its guarded gates (many examples come to
mind): a case of double insularity. In ‘paradises’, like the Cook Islands, argu-
ably the Paciﬁc’s best kept secret (http://www.ck/), ‘corruption and various
ﬁnancial scandals came to light’ (Crocombe, 1979; Aldrich & Connell,
1998: 267). In St Helena, proposed as a prototype society of equals by the
East India Company, the experiment went horribly wrong: ‘the levelling con-
stitution and egalitarian identity of St Helena proposed on the pages penned
in East India House were crumpled and torn within a few years’ (Royle,
2007: 3). On Tristan da Cunha, there was hatred between some families who
Figure 1. Bray (1992: 26). Artwork by William Pang, University of Hong Kong.
Reproduced with permission.
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did not intermarry for generations – Glasses never wed Cotton or Greens –
despite a lack of potential spouses (Royle, 1997).
A more plausible and critical approach is to combine these two extreme
positions into a behavioural model that explains why small, ‘gold ﬁsh bowl
societies’ (Lillis, 1993: 6) canappear to be harmonious, and yet experience internal
divisions. In a rare comparative qualitative review, involving the nature of politics
in the Faroes, Isle of Man, and Malta – by all measures, three democratic, small
island jurisdictions – Richards (1982: passim) alerts us to
. . . deep conﬂicts; of big government and a largely absent role for an organised
opposition; and of the softening effect of brokerage networks that connect and
bridge any parties in tense conﬂict . . . Deep factionalism can co-exist with
strong pressures for conformity and compliance . . . [G]roup conﬂicts are less
frequent; but more explosive and charged, and more likely to impact on the
whole community, when they occur.
In what is perhaps the best known attempt to develop a positivist appreciation
of the linkage between size and democracy, Dahl and Tufte (1973: 92) propose
a ‘paradigm’ that suggests a number of distinct yet inter-related propositions:
the members of smaller systems are more homogenous; the incentives to
conform are stronger; those who openly dissent are fewer (and may be
tempted to consider exile, thus reinforcing the dominant culture by default);
the chances that group conﬂicts involve personal conﬂicts are higher; and the
processes for dealing with conﬂict are more ad hoc and less institutionalised.
In their own words, as a political system gets smaller:
. . . variations in behaviour are fewer, a higher percentage of the population
adheres to a single code, the norms of the code are easily communicated by
word and example, violations are visible, sanctions are easy to apply by means
of both gross and subtle forms of social interaction, and avoidance of sanctions
is difﬁcult. (Dahl & Tufte, 1973: 92)
So, once again, the conclusion is that group conﬂicts in small scale environ-
ments are rare but explosive and likely to polarise the whole community
when they happen (also May & Tupounuia, 1980: 423; Sutton, 1987: 13–14).
A shocking revelation of ‘serpents in paradise’ has been provided by
Birkett (1997) and Souhami (2007) in relation to Pitcairn, the last remaining
UK overseas territory in the Paciﬁc, and the world’s smallest overseas territory
by population (around 50). Instead of an idyllic picture, the news that came
from Pitcairn and gripped the news headlines in 2004 reported extensive
child abuse: six men were found guilty of rape and indecent assault (Fletcher,
2008). A detective inspector involved in the operation explained the situation
lucidly, and reminds us of Lord of the Flies:
Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 111
There was a culture passed down from family to family, and a group of men
who perpetrated abuse on every girl they could. Their fathers and grandfathers
were doing exactly the same things. . . . Was it because of isolation? Or was
it just because they could? I don’t know the answer. Maybe the truth is
that if you leave people to their own devices, without any recourse to
outside authority, a male-dominated structure will emerge and the whole com-
munity will just become animalistic. (Robert Vinson, quoted in Harvey, 2004:
17)
Serpents can take various forms. Cohen (1977: 306), writing about the small
community of the island of Whalsay, in the Shetland Islands off Scotland, com-
ments about how ‘public argument is rare, partly because it is consciously
avoided and partly because of the careful formulation of assertive statements’.
Christensen and Hampton (1999) describe the way in which Jersey, a small sub-
national island jurisdiction that enjoys generous measures of self-government,
could be deemed to have had its state become captive to private global capital
and the powerful offshore ﬁnance industry in whose service the Jersey
economy and government now work.
Island paradises: ‘Hell for Dissidents’
The citizens of small island jurisdictions are often portrayed as resilient com-
munities; unsurprisingly, they command high levels of bonding social capital
(Baldacchino, 2005), deﬁned as ‘networks, together with shared norms,
values and understandings, that facilitate co-operation within and among
groups’ (Helliwell, 2003: 9). Their political system is corporatist, harbouring
an executive government that is watched as closely by a scrutinising and pol-
itically savvy public (Kersell, 1985: 377), as much as it oversees, and interferes
in, all local goings on.
The intense public scrutiny of the political system extends to the social. A
complex web of acquaintances, contacts and networks emerges among
societies where there is role diffusion (individuals agree, or are obliged, to
work beyond their job description); role enlargement (individuals have more
space for innovation at work because of leaner hierarchies and often absent
superiors) and role multiplicity (where individuals ‘wear many hats’ and prac-
tise polyvalency) (Baldacchino, 1997; also Benedict, 1967; Boissevain, 1974;
Anckar, 2008: 437). Such a tangled web of particularism (Benedict, 1967)
extends to all social members and is at once both clannish (escalating and
roping in allies in conditions of conﬂict), and mollifying (even the worst of
enemies would have common friends or would personally know individuals
whom they both trust). This clannishness is powerful, protective and resource-
ful: small is beautiful, but to those who belong. In the eyes of the Whalsay
island community, it is simply and crudely ‘the interference of outsiders’ that
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causes problems (Cohen, 1977: 305); the rest of the world is the permanent
enemy of the Whalsayman (Cohen, 1978).
Writing about Prince Edward Island (PEI), Canada, David Weale looks
back at his childhood and speaks about the intensive social interaction which
fostered a ‘communal togetherness’ (Weale, 1992: 10), but which also
doubled as a ‘straitjacket of community surveillance . . . a heavy harness of
opinion and expectation thrown over the vitality of human inclination’
(Weale, 1992: 9, 10). This togetherness is driven by ‘a strong cultural norm
of sameness’ (PEI Population Strategy Panel, 1999: 56), ﬂeshed out in
robust and resilient communities disproportionately made up of white, Anglo-
phone, Christian and heterosexual members. Recent immigrants to PEI are con-
cerned that Prince Edward Islanders thrive in an exclusive culture that could
make its members clique-ist, even racist, with respect to ‘come from aways’
(Baldacchino, 2006: 74). Canada’s two island/mainly island provinces – PEI
and Newfoundland and Labrador – are the most culturally homogenous pro-
vinces in the country and the ones which attract, and retain, the least proportion
of recent immigrants to Canada (Baldacchino, 2012). Island paradises can be
‘hell for dissidents’ (Thakurta, 2006).
Dramatic exceptions
Any alleged causal and positive relationship between size, geography and
democracy would need to be able to convincingly explain some dramatic
departures from expected behaviour. Furthermore, such behaviour need not
be presumed to be exclusive to small island states: this paper is ﬁghting
against the uncritical assumption that small island polities are spared the demo-
cratic departures and tribulations of larger countries.
First, there is the ‘collapse of good governance and democratic crises in a
number of small, often island states’, as indicated by coups, partisan and/or
ethnic violence in recent decades in such places as the Comoros, Cyprus, Fiji,
Mauritius, the Solomons, Tonga and Vanuatu (Baldacchino, 2005: 35); and
the ‘riches to rags’ story of Nauru (Connell, 2006). One cannot forget such
places like Equatorial Guinea, a small (and part-island) country which is ‘nom-
inally a multiparty democracy, [but where] elections have generally been con-
sidered a sham’ (BBC News, 2010); and is one of the world’s top twelve,
most corrupt countries (Transparency International, 2006). President Obiang
Nguema, the ‘God of Equatorial Guinea’, was re-elected in 2009 with 96.7
per cent of votes cast (Reporters without Borders, 2010). In the Caribbean,
Antigua and Barbuda (population 100,000) ‘operated under a form of arbitrary
rule [during the Bird Sr and Jr regime] with some degree of political intimida-
tion. Transparency and accountability were subordinated to the impulses of a
personal mode of leadership’(Cooper, 2011: 70; also Payne, 1999). While in
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the Turks and Caicos Islands (population 30,000), Premier Michael Misick, ‘the
king of sleaze’, resigned following an inquiry that found ‘information in abun-
dance pointing to a high probability of systematic corruption or serious dishon-
esty’. Misick, a lawyer, also performed the roles of minister of tourism, civil
aviation and planning, plus being an estate agent, law ﬁrm consultant and a
director of property ﬁrms (The Independent on Sunday, 2009).
Second, the absence or weakness of political parties, even of a political
party culture, is telling. There are six other, rather small states (island and
non-island) – though some with populations larger than one million, which
either restrict or do not even allow political parties to operate: Bahrain,
Bhutan, Djibouti, Qatar, Swaziland ‘. . . and, for obvious reasons, Vatican
City’ (Anckar, 1999: 38–39). Klomp (1986) explains how personalities
readily trump policies, institutions and ideologies in the Dutch Caribbean.
Meanwhile, the story is similar, but for altogether different reasons, in the
insular/small state Paciﬁc. Anckar (1999: 39) observes that there are no politi-
cal parties in Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and Tuvalu. If one
accepts that ‘the success of democratisation is in part dependent on the exist-
ence of institutionalised parties and party systems of government’ (Smith,
2003: 148), then the more categorical conclusion would be that ‘democratisa-
tion has failed in the Paciﬁc islands’ (Rich et al., 2006: 25).2 In one other
Paciﬁc island jurisdiction (Samoa), universal suffrage is a very recent (1991)
development (So’o, 2006: 198). Even so, only matai (chiefs) can run for ofﬁce.
Third, one continues to come across statements that ‘the impact of size on
democracy is increasing over time’, and that ‘islandness emerges as the relevant
physical determinant of democracy’ (Anckar, 2008: 454). While such state-
ments have sought to be more nuanced – by bringing in the role of Christianity,
for example – they remain largely gross assessments of small state behaviour
undertaken by non-participant observers, ‘looking in from outside’.
Conclusion
Neither small size nor islandness are predictors of democracy. Small island
states and territories can deceive in their alluring attractiveness: there may be
many more Dr Moreaus out there than we may care to realise (Wells, 1896).
Consensual practices and unitarism may indeed prevail in such locales:
‘[s]mall island residents simply know that they must get along’ (Richardson,
1992: 195). Granted; but perhaps one should not wax lyrical about such
expressions of harmony and solidarity, and leave them unchallenged. Rather,
one could be better prepared to also acknowledge and investigate their
darker origins and implications.
Political scientists would do well to emulate research in organisational soci-
ology that has offered some insights into the unitarist power dynamics and
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undisputed leadership that prevail in very small ﬁrms (e.g. Scase, 1995; Baldac-
chino, 1999a, 1999b). There too, ‘small isn’t beautiful’ (Rainnie, 1985). There
may very well be democratic deﬁcits on small island jurisdictions that trans-
cend institutional structures and practices, and may even provide vital clues
as to why so many islanders and other small state citizens decide, or are
obliged, to emigrate and settle elsewhere. Perhaps it is precisely because
they promote a strong sense of fellowship and community that small island resi-
dents tolerate ‘big man’ politics and non-democratic practices.
This paper’s intent has been largely provocative and demonstrative; it does
not prove that small island states and territories are non-democratic and are rather
autocracies in disguise; only piecemeal (albeit suggestive) evidence has been
proposed with this in mind here. Rather, this paper argues that small, often
island spaces continue to be gripped by a powerful but naive mythology, one
that presents them as invariably harmonious polities; such ‘getting along’
needs to be more seriously questioned and more deeply critiqued.
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Notes
1. This paper will not engage with ongoing debates about what is a ‘small island’ or a
‘small state’ (on this particular topic, see Baldacchino, 2011). It reviews island jur-
isdictions, both states and self-governing territories, that have resident populations
of one million or less. Pitcairn (population around 45) is often acknowledged as the
world’s smallest island jurisdiction; at the other end, the cut-off point could be
Mauritius (with a population of 1.3 m), Jamaica (2.7 m) or even Singapore (5 m).
2. The ‘if’ is important: Anckar and Anckar (2000) have argued in favour of democ-
racies without political parties.
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